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Non-monetary rewards could be used to incentivise blood
donation
Joan Costa-Font, Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Steven T Yen present research into incentivising
blood donation. Classic research has found that monetary incentives to blood donors may
crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate if a reward
is involved. However it is argued that there would be no supply displacement of altruistic
donors if non-monetary rewards were offered instead.
There is increasing interest in the motivation of  altruistic behaviour, not merely f or the
sake of  exploring behavioural drives which go beyond classical axioms of  self - interest to
explain individual behaviour, but more recently as a means of  correcting government interventions which
are held to crowd out individual actions. For example, the current government has advocated the notion
of  a ‘big society’, which, although rather unclearly def ined, appears to have altruistic behaviour as a
central theme. While there is much loose-talk centred around the def init ion of  this policy tool, there is a
growing interest in whether such behaviour can be motivated through incentive mechanisms.
There has thus been interest in nudging behaviour towards pre-specif ied outcomes such as tackling
health inequalit ies, preventing ill-health, improving health outcomes and spreading inf ormation and good
health advice. Possibly one of  the most long- lasting and discussed examples of  behaviour broadly
consistent with this notion of  core altruistic behaviour is individual blood donation.
One donated unit of  whole blood can save up to three lives but donated blood has a short shelf  lif e.
Regular donors are theref ore essential to secure a constant supply. In 1997, the World Health
Organization (WHO) recommended that all blood donations should come f rom unpaid voluntary donors.
However, by 2006, only 49 of  124 countries surveyed had established this as a standard. Furthermore, in
the WHO’s European region, the number of  donors varies f rom less than 4.5 to over 45 per 1000
population. Only 39 per cent of  the general population are eligible to donate, and f ewer than 5 per cent
of  those eligible actually donate.
The issue of  the nature of  the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse ef f ects of  f inancial
rewards f or blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic literature with
limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) f amously pointed out, providing monetary incentives to blood
donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may f eel less inclined to donate if  a
reward is involved – in addition to having the ef f ect of  reducing blood quality.
There is increasing interest in the motivation of  altruistic behaviour, not merely f or the sake of  exploring
behavioural drives which go beyond classical axioms of  self - interest to explain individual behaviour, but
more recently as a means of  correcting government interventions which are held to crowd out individual
actions.
In Costa-Font et al (2012), we examine how f avouring dif f erent types of  incentives are related to the
likelihood of  donating blood by exploit ing a large sample representative of  the population of  f if teen
European countries in 2002 containing inf ormation on both donation and attitudes towards incentives.
Our results indicate that those who believe that monetary rewards should be given f or blood donation
are less likely to have donated blood, while those f avouring non-monetary rewards instead are equally or
more likely to have donated blood. Of f ering monetary rewards f or blood donation might indeed crowd
out blood supply as the altruistic individual do not f avour monetary rewards. There is some cross-
country variability in Europe, although crowding out exists without exception in all European countries
Our results also indicate, however, that there would be no supply displacement of  altruistic donors if
non-monetary rewards were of f ered instead. Thus, non-monetary rewards could potentially be used to
incentivise blood donation, as this kind of  rewards seems not to remove incentives.
Males are more likely to be donors, more likely to f avour monetary rewards, but not more likely to be in
f avour of  non-monetary rewards. As noted earlier, males may be more likely to be donors f or physical
reasons (e.g., higher body weight, absence of  pregnancy and lactation period, and lower likelihood of
being anaemic). Other explanations include the f act that some countries organise blood drives to
f actories and other places with a higher percentage of  males and even motivate very strongly those in
the military service to give blood as is the case in Austria.
This research article: Joan Costa-Font, Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Steven T. Yen (2012).  “Not all
Incentives Wash out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited”, can be seen in full
here. 
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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